False Data Injection Attacks on AC Power System State Estimation Using Cosimulation

The secure and reliable operation of an electric power grid is critical to national security. Power grid components such as the state estimator used to monitor the operating state of a power system are subject to cyber-attacks. Previous works show that an intruder can compromise the state estimation by injecting the pre-designed false data into meters without being detected if the detailed knowledge of a transmission grid is known. In this project, we show that the FDIA on AC state estimation can even be successfully launched using phasor measurement units (PMU) data without knowing the topology and line parameters of a power grid. The designed FDIA attack will be implemented using a cosimulation platform (with both power system simulator and communication network
simulator) to evaluate its impacts on power systems. The project will provide a better understanding about the attack behaviors on generic AC state estimation and important guidance regarding the design of mitigation measures to ensure the secure operation of power systems.

Mingqiu Du
Faculty Supervisor: 
Xiaozhe Wang
Partner University: