Curiosity and methodological skepticism in Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature

In his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume proposed a new philosophical approach based on what he called “the science of human nature”. This science consisted in a kind of cartography aiming to establish the epistemological possibilities of the human mind considered on the base of its passionate and social dimensions. I argue that at the heart of this new approach to philosophy there is a skeptical attitude, according to which the epistemic aspirations of the researcher should be constrained by an emotional standard: a moderated curiosity. I contend that such a suggestion implies the existence of a methodological skepticism in Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. During my stay at Yale’s Philosophy Department, I will work in order to show how Hume’s skeptical epistemology, in particular the skeptical arguments he deploys and the crisis he enacts in part 4 of book one of Treatise, fits his methodological skepticism. The tangible products associated to this stage of my research project will be a draft of a chapter to be included in my dissertation and a paper to be presented to The Society for Early Modern Philosophy at Yale (SEMPY) […]

Faculty Supervisor:

Dario Perinetti

Student:

Partner:

Yale University

Discipline:

Sociology

Sector:

Education

University:

Université du Québec à Montréal

Program: