Hume and the Principle of Sufficient Reason

This project aims to show that Hume does not reject the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), but rather proposes an understanding of it. Some scholars, such as Della Rocca (2018, 2021), Schrenk (2010), and Pruss (2006), have argued that Hume rejects the PSR when he discusses the causal maxim: “whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence” (T 1.3.3.1). These scholars have assumed that Hume rejects the necessary connection between cause and effect and accepts the existence of brute facts, i.e., facts for which no explanation can be given. Additionally, Hume rejects the conceivability of the notion of “efficient cause” (T 1.3.14.27). It seems, then, that Hume rejects the PSR. However, Hume rejects the existence of brute facts because he denies that “any thing might arise without a Cause” and claims that the causal maxim is an empirical truth. These commitments raise a problem: How does Hume understand the PSR such that necessary connection and efficient power are not part of it? I aim to answer this question, showing that Hume develops a positive understanding of the PSR, such as the necessary connection and the notion that an efficient cause cannot be part of it.

Faculty Supervisor:

Dario Perinetti

Student:

Partner:

Yale University

Discipline:

Sociology

Sector:

Education

University:

Université du Québec à Montréal

Program: